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Abstract 
This paper looks beyond the comparatively good performance of the large 
emerging economies that gave rise to the mainstream narrative of decoupling.  
I discuss the negative economic and social impacts of the financial and 
economic crisis on the Least Developed Countries that the mainstream 
narrative hides below the veil of well performing large countries. The negative 
macroeconomic consequences are directly observed in a reduction of the 
foreign contribution to capital formation in LDCs and a deceleration of the 
growth of per capita Gross Domestic Product. Official Development Aid does 
not offer recourse contracting in real terms in 2011 and falling short by US$ 51 
billion over 2008-2011. 
The potential implications for human development are important. The paper 
indicates that Millennium Development Goals  (especially in the fields of 
poverty, child mortality and universal primary education) will be more difficult 
to attain in the Least Developed Countries. 
Keywords 
Crisis, Least Developed Countries, official development aid, foreign direct 
investment. 
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Where the Financial and Economic Crisis Does Bite: 
Impact on the Least Developed Countries 
1 Introduction 
The current mainstream narrative about the impact of the financial and 
economic crisis in developing countries is a rather positive story. In contrast to 
the developed world, where the impact of the crisis obviously deteriorates 
growth and public finances, developing countries and emerging markets are 
seen as the poles of global growth. This hypothesis of decoupling emerged 
early on in the financial and economic crisis also because banks in developing 
countries had not been involved in irresponsible financial innovation (see Kose 
and IMF 2007, World Bank 2008, Prasad 2009, Vos 2011a). The implications 
of the main narrative are clear: the levels of economic activity of countries 
located outside the OECD area apparently continue to be well in positive 
territory. Growth perspectives attract foreign capital flows and – since these 
flows towards the developing and emerging economies predominantly consist 
of Foreign Direct Investment and remittances – debt ratio’s are on a 
downward trend. Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate the positive mainstream 
narrative numerically on the basis of the most recent IMF World economic outlook 
database and UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2011. By and large the global 
financial and economic crisis thus (according to he mainstream narrative) 
would seem to have bypassed the emerging and developing countries.  
TABLE 1  
Key economic indicators emerging and developing economies  
(period averages 1990-2017, percentages) 
 1990-2000 2001-2006 2007-2011 2012-2017 
IMF forecast 
Real GDP growth 3.8 6.3 6.3 6.1 
Investment share in GDP 25.6 26.2 30.5 32.8 
Gross national savings to GDP 23.7 28.7 33.1 33.8 
Real import growth 10.1 9.8 8.0 7.9 
Real export growth 9.0 9.4 5.7 7.4 
General government gross debt to GDP  49.0 36.5 36.0 27.3 
Current account balance to GDP -1.5 2.9 2.6 n/a 
Total external debt to GDP 37.1 32.7 25.6 n/a 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook data base, April 2012, accessed May 8, 2012 
Note: a end of period 
 
Against the background of cuts in the volume of Official Development 
Assistance (DAC, 2012) of -2.7% in 2011 for Developing Countries and of 
even -8.9% for the group of Least Developed Countries, I will argue that the 
positive mainstream narrative is too good to be true, at least for the most 
vulnerable group of developing countries. The present mainstream discourse 
analyses economic development through a specific lens that focuses on the 
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aggregate or average performance of a heterogeneous group of countries that is 
being dominated by a very few, very large, very fast growing countries, in 
particular China, India, Indonesia and Brazil. This lens obscures the costs of 
the crisis that are increasingly borne by smaller and less successful developing 
economies. 
Figure 1 
Capital flows to developing countries 
(2005-2010, Billions of Dollars, current prices and exchange rates) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2011a), Table 1.4 p. 21 
  
One important contribution of this paper is thus that it looks behind the 
smokescreen of the continued good performance of the big emerging 
economies as I focus on the negative economic and social impacts of the 
financial and economic crisis in the Least Developed Countries.1 These 
negative macroeconomic consequences of the crisis are directly observed in a 
reduction in the foreign contribution to capital formation in the Least 
Developed Countries and by a concomitant deceleration of the growth of their 
(per capita) GDP. The second contribution of this paper is that it discusses the 
shortfall of Official Development Aid since the start of the crisis. Obviously 
these two issues are closely linked: the mainstream discourse neglects the plight 
of the 850 million people that live in the Least Developed Countries, as the 
development narrative of the mainstream is the continued success of the big 
emerging economies that do not depend on foreign aid. This sets the stage for 
a seemingly ‘painless’ reduction of aid flows to the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses 
some of the difficulties of observing economic developments during times of 
crisis and in particular in countries with low levels of development. Section 3 
focuses on the direct economic impact in LDCs. This section documents the 
growth deceleration of per capita GDP since the onset of the financial and 
                                                
1 The Appendix lists the Least Developed Countries 
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economic crisis as well as the reduction in foreign direct investment since the 
start of the crisis. This section also argues that the outlook for Official 
Development Assistance is bleak and that preservation of remittances as a 
stable flow of funds may become difficult if the global unemployment situation 
deteriorates. Therefore a further reduction of savings and investment rates and 
consequently of growth (potential) is a realistic scenario for the Least 
Developed Countries. Section 4 additionally discusses the potential impact of 
lower growth on health, life expectancy and gender issues. Section 5 draws 
some conclusions. 
2 Measurement and identification 
It is always difficult to see where you are sailing in the midst of a storm. An 
economic depression is not different. In general the statistical measurement 
tools are designed for normal conditions, but once business fluctuations 
become exceptionally large the normal statistical procedures may no longer 
yield unbiased estimates. This is true both for developed and for developing 
countries although the latter will probably encounter more severe problems. In 
addition to the problem of inaccuracy in measurement, the timeliness of the 
construction and publication of statistics can be problematic and this is 
especially so at lower levels of development. So it should not come as a 
surprise that many early analyses on the impact of the financial and economic 
crisis outside the OECD start with a warning that we do not yet know what 
has actually happened in many countries – and especially for segments of the 
population – simply because reliable real time data are unavailable (see, for 
example, Van Bergeijk, de Haan and van der Hoeven. 2011, p. 3).  Although 
we are now five years into the crisis many data are still not available. One way 
to deal with this uncertainty is to use, combine and triangulate indicators, 
methods, historical experiences and theory in order to get at a reliable 
assessment of current conditions in the Least Developed Countries. This 
article follows this approach sometimes resorting to basic social science 
detective work, but always making good use of the most recently available 
information from different international databases, such as those of 
UN/DESA, UNCTAD, World Bank and the IMF. (Note that the IMF does 
not report aggregates or averages for the LDC category and that the 
construction of LDC-group data can only be roughly approximated; I will 
often resort to median observations for this group.2) 
In addition to recent hard data, historical lessons are important, for 
example to discharge the argument that the financial crisis would not hit the 
developing countries as the banks in these countries did not have toxic assets 
or because there was no detachment between the real and the financial 
valuation of transactions (see for an example of this line of argumentation 
Moro Visconto 2009). History tells that the world crisis of the 1930s also 
started in the center, but later spread to the periphery with ultimately a strong 
impact on the informal capital markets in the periphery (see Kindleberger, 
                                                
2 Islam (2011) follows a similar approach. 
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1973 and Rothermund, 1996).  There is no reason to expect that the current 
financial and economic crisis is different from the 1930s in this respect and 
that in itself questions the decoupling narrative.3 More recent history can 
provide light on important policy question as it can help to point out how the 
crisis will influence donor country behaviour (Roodman 2008, Frot 2009; see 
also Gravier-Rymaszewska, 2012) and how economic distress influences 
human development including gender issues, education and health (World 
Bank 2010, Sumner et al. 2010, Annex, pp. 35-50). On the former issue this 
article already reports concrete empirical evidence that the lessons from the 
past were valid also in this crisis; on the latter the statistics are not yet available 
since the most recent data at the international organizations still are for 2009. 
With these caveats in mind we can now proceed to the discussion of current 
developments and the impact of the financial and economic crisis on the Least 
Developed Countries. 
3 The economic impact of the crisis 
The crisis impacts on growth and finance. Although growth and finance are 
closely linked  I will deal with these aspects in different sections, because 
finance also involves behavior at the origin of international capital flows, thus 
bringing the economic conditions in developed countries into the picture as 
well. Section 3.1 thus first takes a look at recent macroeconomic developments 
in the Least Developed Countries and section 3.2 discussed developments and 
outlook of Foreign Direct Investment, Official Development Aid and 
remittances. 
3.1 Macroeconomic developments in the Least Developed 
Countries 
Table 2 provides a snapshot of macroeconomic developments in the Least 
Developed Countries, giving economic evidence for their slow-down in per 
capita GDP growth since the start of crisis. Actually the period average for 
2007-2011 sketches to rosy a picture since the average hides the extent to 
which the annual growth rates follow a downward trajectory (see Figure 2). 
UNCTAD (2011, pp. 5-7) notes two other kinds of heterogeneity hidden 
under with important implications. Firstly, although the average growth rate 
remains positive about one fifth of the countries fell into a recession and GDP 
per capita contracted in 18 out of 48 countries in 2009. Secondly, only 10 of 
the 48 LDCs would in the UNCTAD forecasts grow fast enough to reach the 
targets of the Istanbul ‘Programme of Action for the Least Developed 
Countries for the Decade 2011-2020’. As will become clear even that 
assessment may seem to be too optimistic given the current trends.  
Indeed, from Table 2 it becomes clear that important drivers of the 
growth slow down are the reduced external demand for median LDC exports 
and the steady decline in median gross domestic savings rate that has a negative 
                                                
3 See also Adams-Kane et al. 2011. 
9 
 
impact on capital formation. Importantly, IMF forecasts indicate a trend of 
continued and increasing current account deficits and this offers an additional 
indication that foreign capita will be necessary to increase saving and 
investment.4 So let us turn to the relevant question about the availability of 
foreign capital for the Least Developed Countries. 
TABLE 2  
Key economic indicators Least Developed Countries  
(period averages 1990-2013) 
 2001-2006 2007-2011 2012-2013 
Forecasts 
Real GDP per capita growth 4.5 4.0 2.7 
Gross national savings to GDPa 15.7 14.5 13.8 
Real import growtha 7.0 8.9 6.6 
Real export growtha 7.4 4.8 6.0 
General government gross debt to GDPa 83.5 39.0 35.9 
Current account balance to GDP -5.1 -8.1 -9.4 
Sources: UN/DESA data base for per capita growth and IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2012, 
accessed May 8, 2012 
Note: a based on median calculated from the IMF World Economic Outlook database (which does not always report on all 
LDCs) 
3.2 Capital flows to the Least Developed Countries 
Foreign Direct Investment is not only relevant because it provides foreign 
capital, but also because of the spillover effects on productivity to domestic 
sectors (Mebratie and van Bergeijk 2013). Changes in incoming Foreign Direct 
Investment thus increase and improve the capital stock. Foreign investment 
into the developing and transition countries fully recovered after the crisis 
reaching a new record high in 2011 (UNCTAD 2012). However, according to 
UNCTAD (2011b, pp. 56-61), Foreign Direct Investments in the Least 
Developed countries in 2010 were still one fifth smaller than in 2008 while it 
remained unclear if and when these flows would regain their pre-crisis level.5 
Figure 2 illustrates the development of Foreign Direct Investment pointing out 
that its share in gross fixed capital formation in the Least developed Countries 
almost halved since the start of the crisis. Figure 2 relates this development to 
the growth rate of per capita GDP, both because this is the only available 
indicator for the general productivity level and because GDP per capita is an 
important basic indicator of the economic activity level in the Least Developed 
Countries. 
                                                
4 Note again that Table 2 reports median developments for the group of 48 Least 
Developed Countries. 
5 UNCTAD (2012) reports that the African continent continued its decline in FDI 
flows in 2011. 
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Figure 2 
Foreign capital and LDC growth 2000-2011  
 
Sources: UNCTAD 2011a, p. 74 and UN/DESA 
The outlook for private capital flows to the Least Developed Countries thus is 
bleak; the outlook for public capital flows, unfortunately, is not better. Table 3 
shows the changes in Official Development Aid since the start of the crisis. In 
line with fears expressed early on in the crisis (Roodman 2008, Frot 2009, van 
Bergeijk 2009) many donor countries reduced real levels of Official 
Development Aid.  
TABLE 3  
Growth and Contraction of ODA 2008-20011 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Real growth at constant exchange rates and prices 11% 1% 6% -3% 
Number of DAC donors that reduced real ODA 2 11 6 16 
Sources: OECDstat.extracts accessed May 9, 2012 and DAC (2012) 
In 2009 11 donor countries trimmed down their aid bringing ODA to a virtual 
stand still as the amount of aid increased by a mere 0.7 per cent.6 In 2011 the 
majority (16!) of the donors cut ODA and often from already reduced levels 
reducing total ODA by -2.7% and average country effort decreased from 
                                                
6 Importantly this was not the result of increased spending but solely due to exchange 
rate movements that contributed more than 4 percentage points. Also note that recent 
revisions of ODA for earlier years put the growth rate now at 1.0% in 2009 
(OECDstat.extracts accessed May 9, 2012). 
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0.49% to 0.46% of Gross National Income (14 countries reduced their effort; 
DAC 2012). The contrast with the OECD (2009) estimates that the underlying 
trend growth rate of the volume of official development aid (ODA) needed to 
increase to 11 per cent per year in order to achieve the Millennium Goals is 
painful, to say the least.7 According to the OECD (2009, p. 103-104), 
At the time of the Gleneagles G8 and UN Millennium +5 summits in 2005, donors 
committed to increase their aid. These commitments would raise ODA by USD 50 billion in 
2010 compared with 2004 (at 2004 prices and exchange rates). Excluding debt relief and 
humanitarian aid, which are expected to return to their historical levels by 2010, the annual 
growth required to reach the target is 11%. 
Figure 3 
Average annual real growth rate of ODA 2008-2011 by donor 
 
Sources: OECDstat.extracts accessed May 9, 2012 and DAC (2012) 
Figure 3 illustrates how the different donors have fared during the crisis. Only 
Korea and the United Kingdom meet the OECD’s estimated requirement of 
an annual real 11% growth in Official Development Assistance. The clear 
                                                
7 Many recent policy documents appear to have considered the possibility of a real 
reduction in ODA as an unrealistic scenario and were mainly seeing the 2010 increase 
as a return to normal pre-crisis aid relations. An example is World Bank 2011, pp. 
126-128. 
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implication is that the public funds made available to the Least Developed 
Countries fall significantly short of the levels that are required to reach the 
Millennium Development Goals. The average real annual compound growth 
rate over 2008-2011 is 3.8% p.a.  
Table 4 estimates the shortfall and compares actual and target growth rates 
in order to assess annual and cumulative growth surpluses and deficits (the 
percentage gap between target and actual growth rate). Since the target is to 
reach the preset level of ODA at the end of 2010, the target rate for 2011 is set 
at zero. The table starts in 2008, the first crisis year, in order to focus on the 
impact of the crisis proper (the year 2008, registered a real growth rate for 
ODA in excess of the 11% target). The next step is to confront these growth 
rates with actual ODA flows valued at 2010 prices in order to make the annual 
amounts comparable and allow for aggregation. The final column of Table 4 
gives the ODA shortfall (in 2008: a surplus) per year. The total ODA shortfall 
over 2008-2011 can thus be estimated at US$ 51 billion and for the year 2011 
at 22 billion US dollar (10.3% of actual flows over the period). 
TABLE 4  
Shortfall of net ODA during 2008-2011 (at constant 2010 prices) 
Year Growth rates 
Target         Actual 
%                  % 
Annual surplus 
or deficit 
% 
Cumulative surplus 
or deficit 
% 
ODA in billion US$ 
Actual flow        Shortfall 
2008 11 11.3 0.3 0.3 119.5 0.4 
2009 11 1.0 -10.0 -9.0 120.9 -11.4 
2010 11 6.3 -4.7 -13.3 128.5 -18.4 
2011 0 -2.7 -2.7 -15.5 125.1 -21.8 
Total  3.8   493.9 -51.1 
Sources: OECDstat.extracts accessed May 13, 2012 and DAC (2012) 
With little hope for a recovery of Foreign Direct Investment and with no 
recourse from Official Development Aid, the only remaining relevant capital 
flow consists of remittances. Remittances have been very resilient during the 
crisis and continue to be an important capital inflow for the Least Developed 
Countries. In fact this is a very hopeful stylized fact (and one that, incidentally, 
contradicts pessimistic views that prevailed at the start of the financial and 
economic crisis). The big, and as yet unanswerable, question, however, is 
whether remittances will be able to continue to play their useful role in the 
foreseeable future, not so much because emigrants would not like to send 
money to their home countries anymore, but because they may not be able to 
do so if unemployment abroad and return migration were to increase. An 
indication that it may become increasingly realistic to consider this risk is 
provided by observations by central bankers in Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda 
who, as reported by Barak Harif and Richardson (2012), note a reduction of 
remittances in particular from the euro region. 
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The conclusions of this section are sobering. The crisis has certainly not 
passed the Least Developed Countries: capital formation is no longer 
supported by private investment and public aid; a further reduction of savings 
and investment rates and consequently of growth (potential) is a realistic 
scenario. The decoupling hypothesis is not relevant for the Least Developed 
Countries. 
4 Expected impact on human development and MDGs 
It is still difficult and probably to early to ascertain the full impact of the 
financial and economic crisis on human development, but it is clear that the 
2007-2011 growth deceleration, the reduced availability of public and private 
foreign capital over this period in combination with the quite limited prospects 
for LDC export growth in the near future reduce the probability of achieving 
Millennium Development Goals. Indeed, the outlook contrasts with the rather 
optimistic analyses prepared when observers were counting on a quick and 
sustained return to the pre-crisis conditions and suggested that the Millennium 
Development Goals remained well in reach. Sumner et al. (2010, p. 2) rightly 
observe “The MDGs comprised an approach born of a benign era of relative 
stability, stronger economic growth and fairly buoyant aid budgets. We now 
face a very different world”.  Under the current conditions it is not pessimistic, 
but realistic to take a close look at assessments of growth decelerations. 
The Global Monitoring Report 2010 (World Bank, 2010, pp. 107-113) 
presents instructive analyses with the World Bank’s Maquette for MDG 
Simulations that deal with two types of low income countries (resource rich 
and resource poor) and develops a number of possible scenario’s.8 The base 
case in the scenarios assumes that the real growth rate of GDP recovers to pre-
crisis values in 2011, steady growth of foreign aid and weak remittances and 
FDI until 2015. The worst case scenario (“low aid”) describes a two thirds 
reduction of the GDP growth rate and a three quarters reduction in the rate of 
growth of development aid. The previous sections uncovered a reduction in 
the growth rate of GDP by some forty per cent and of aid by about sixty five 
percent. This is a little bit  better than the low-aid-low-growth scenario, but far 
worse than the World Bank’s base case. With this information in mind, World 
Bank scenarios clarify that the MDGs will be difficult to reach in this 
environment (only the target for primary school completion rates remain 
attainable). The scenarios acknowledge that the improvements that can be 
reaped from better domestic policies (so the internal efforts of the Least 
Developed Countries), although relevant, can presently not by themselves 
achieve the required base-case levels of MDG indicators: “better development 
outcomes hinge critically on … improve(d) export conditions, terms of trade 
and capital flows for low-income countries” (World Bank 2010, p.113). That 
conclusion was drawn in 2010; it gains significant credibility if we consider the 
subsequent experiences of the Least Developed Countries. 
                                                
8 This tool has also been used to investigate the impact of the financial and economic 
crisis on MDGs for a number of individual countries. See for example Vos (2011b). 
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Figure 4 
Comparative impact of growth decelerations on indicators related to MDGs 
 
Source: World Bank 2010, Appendix 2.1 
The Global Monitoring Report 2010 also reports research findings regarding 
growth accelerations and decelerations in 163 countries and the years 1980–
2008 (World Bank, 2010). Figure 4 summarizes the most important findings 
related to key aspects of human development comparing human development 
indicator values achieved on average in normal years and during growth 
decelerations. It is true that the developments that were discussed in the 
previous section do not completely meet all the strict requirements that World 
Bank analysts have formulated for a growth deceleration, but recent events 
come very close to qualifying for a truly significant growth deceleration.9 
Therefore the general lessons of earlier episodes of growth deceleration are 
informative for current debates on the impact of the crisis on human 
development. As before the empirical evidence clearly suggests that many 
human development targets, in particular the targets for the primary 
completion rate and child mortality, become much more difficult to attain as a 
consequence growth decelerations. 
                                                
9 See World Bank (2010), Box 2.1, p. 30. In particular, the four-year forward-moving 
average growth rate exceeds as required both the four-year backward-moving average 
growth rate and the average growth rate over 2000-2013 for four consecutive years, 
but  average GDP per capita during the four-year forward-moving period exceeds the 
average during the four-year backward-moving period so that only two out of the 
three requirements of the World Bank definition are met. 
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TABLE 5 
Least Developed Countries that (can) achieve MDGs 
  Achieved On Track Total 
Poverty 2 3 5 
Universal Primary Education 2 0 2 
Gender parity in primairy education 9 11 20 
Gender parity in secundairy education 2 5 7 
Under-five mortality 0 3 3 
Safe drinking water 6 4 10 
Access to Sanitation 2 1 3 
Source: calculations based on Go and Quijada, (2011), Table 1, page 8  
See also the appendix to this working paper 
Table 5 provides an overview of the prospects that Least Developed Countries 
will be able to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The table reports 
the number of countries that had already achieved the targets in 2011 and the 
number of countries that in 2011 was on track to meet the criteria in 2015. The 
counts confirm that many key targets are not attainable for the majority of 
Least Developed Countries.10 It is relevant that the MDGs that were identified 
by World Bank (2010) to be the most endangered by the crisis also show up in 
low numbers of Least Developed Countries that can be expected to meet the 
MDGs in 2015. Likewise the largest numbers of successful countries are 
identified for the MDG areas that appear to be least vulnerable in the World 
Bank analyses. Triangulation of the results of time series analyses, economy 
wide simulation models and descriptive statistics points out the common 
finding that it has become extremely difficult to reach the Millennium 
Development Goals for the vast majority of Least Developed Countries. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
The debate on the impact of the economic and financial crisis in non-OECD 
countries all too often is based on summary data for emerging and developing 
countries. These aggregate observations and their development over time are 
dominated by the relatively good performance of a very few, very large, very 
fast growing countries.  
This lens keeps the costs of the crisis for the Least Developed Countries 
and their subdued prospects outside the picture. The growth slowdown and 
                                                
10 Ironically, the research from which Table 5 derives its evidence illustrates the lens 
through which researchers at the global institutions look at the Least Developed 
Countries. This is how Go and Quijada, (2011, p. 7) introduce their evidence: “A look 
beneath the aggregate global statistics shows not just middle-income countries doing 
well, but many low-income countries, too … This confirmed that progress in 
individual African and poor countries was indeed strong”. 
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foreign capital decline in the Least Developed Countries have major 
implications. The potential impact on human development is important. The 
previous section clarified that Millennium Development Goals  (especially in 
the fields of poverty, child mortality and universal primary education) will be 
much more difficult to attain (if at all) in the Least Developed Countries. These 
costs should be included in the mainstream narrative, because the neglect of 
this information so to say enables policy makers to overlook the negative 
impact of the crisis on development issues that are relevant for the 850 million 
people that live in the Least Developed Countries. This neglect of their 
difficulties in the mainstream narrative may very well explain why Official 
Development Aid is lagging so significantly behind the commitments of the 
2005 Gleneagles G8 and UN Millennium +5 summits.11   
It is hoped that this paper can contribute to refocusing the discourse so 
that the costs of the policies in the centre that are borne by the periphery 
become part of the mainstream narrative. 
                                                
11 See for an alternative explanation Fialho (2012) who critically analyses the reasons 
behind the LDC category and its apparent lack of success. 
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Appendix: LDCs and MDGs 
 
  
        
Country Poverty Universal 
primary 
Education 
Gender 
parity prim. 
education 
Gender 
parity sec. 
education 
Under-five 
mortality 
Safe drin-
king water 
Access to 
Sanitation 
Afghanistan      A  
Angola        
Bangladesh   A A O   
Benin   O   O  
Bhutan        
Burkina Faso  O   A  
Burundi   O     
C.Afr.Rep O       
Cambodia A  O   O  
Chad        
Comoros   O   A  
Congo Dem. Rep (Zaire)       
Djibouti        
Eq. Guniea        
Eritrea     O   
Ethiopia O  O     
Gambia O  A O  A  
Guinea   O   O  
Guinea-Bissau       
Haiti        
Kiribati        
Lao People's Dem. Republic   O  A 
Lesotho        
Liberia        
Madagascar   A     
Malawi    O  A  
Mali      A  
Mauritania A  A O    
Mozambique       
Myanmar  A A A   A 
Nepal   O O    
Niger        
Rwanda   A O   O 
Samoa        
Sao Tome and Prinicipe       
Senegal        
Sierra Leone  O     
Solomon Islands  O     
Somalia        
Tanzania  A A     
Timor-Leste        
Togo   O     
Tuvalu        
Uganda   A   O  
Vanuatu        
Yemen        
Zambia   A     
Source: calculations based on Go and Quijada, (2011), Table 1, page 
Note: A = Achieved; O = On track 
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